


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Date 3-30-92 HRP 89-2

SPEECH FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

12 September 1955

It is indeed an honor to appear before this Association which so well represents the enforcement of law in that part of the world which is still governed by laws rather than by men.

I am sure that your job is a difficult one, dealing as it does, with such matters as homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, fraud, and auto theft. But consider the plight of police chiefs nowadays in Communist China who are told to ferret out "counter-revolutionaries"; who are ordered to deal with "all who incur criminal responsibility for... violations of labor discipline", and who must be constantly on the alert for what the Communists call "criminals who obstruct the socialist transformation of agriculture"! Imagine what your job would be like if you had to convince a jury in our part of the world that somebody was guilty of obstructing the alleged transformation of agriculture from anything to anything else!

Well, have no fears for the Chinese policemen. They can get convictions for all such "crimes" as socialist obstructionism without any trouble at all. Plentiful "evidence" comes to them by way of special

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"People's Courts" have been instructed by the Minister of Justice to avoid what he calls "Pacific thinking", which he says leads to "the mistake of giving lenient sentences to criminals." The Communist Courts are unlikely to do any "Pacific thinking" from now on if they know what is good for them! Furthermore, the Chinese police have the consolation of being untroubled by auto theft, since practically no one in Communist China owns an automobile!

Or take the case of what the Communists in East Germany call a "police" organization. Here, the lucky "policeman" is by no means confined to such limited choices as walking a beat, directing traffic, or driving a squad car. He can go into artillery, tanks, a navy, or an air force if he wishes to specialize in these fields. And inasmuch as the East German "police force" numbers around 195,000 (?), all trained in Army, Navy, or Air Force tactics, it almost sounds as if the East German government might be creating something more like a military force than a police organization! One might even carry the suspicion further and wonder if the purpose back of the organization, rather

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than being to protect the people's rights, is to suppress any disposition they might show to revolt against the oppressive rule of their Communist masters.

But even suppression by military force does not always work. Recently, these East German "policemen" have been deserting at the rate of 3,200 (?) a month into the free air that lies to the West.

All in all, one fears that the Communists have their problems, when they try to enforce compliance on once-free people!

You must realize that my appreciation of police problems is that of an outsider. Whereas your work is wholly concerned with law enforcement in your respective countries, the Agency that I represent is expressly forbidden by law to take any part in the enforcement of law.

In fact, one of the most significant provisos in the Act of Congress which created a Central Intelligence Agency, is that which excludes this Agency from any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

But even though the work of the Central Intelligence Agency legally cannot, and most certainly will not, invade your particular

of all you do for it. In particular I should like to say that the assistance and support rendered by the chiefs of police in various city and state organizations has been of the greatest value to the Central Intelligence Agency.* I hope we may continue to receive your cooperation.

Although an intelligence agency in a free country must be excluded from any part in the work of the police, there are obvious similarities between the two. Both must be concerned with the collection of evidence; both must undertake careful research in the analysis of the evidence; both must make deductions based on this analysis; and both must produce a well reasoned and authenticated case based upon the whole process.

I don't think I need to go into detail about any of these similarities. But there is another that I should like to bring to your attention which may be less evident: namely, the parallel between the growth in recent times of integrated police procedures and the development of centralized intelligence because they were irreducible conditions

* Colonel Grogan - This is exactly as Bannerman stated it. If it seems insufficient, I could call Bannerman for amplification.

The year 1908 makes a good starting point. In that year O. Henry published "The Gentle Grafter" which told about some lovable charlatans who went from place to place in the south west swindling the public and getting away with it because they could avoid punishment by keeping on the move. Law enforcement was considered a local problem then and was locally handled. The "Gentle Grafter" were always safe in the next town. It was in that same year, however, some fifteen years, by the way, after the founding of your own organization, that more-than-local aspects of crime were recognized by the Attorney General in the formation of the first Federal Bureau of Investigation. But the establishment of the FBI, and its beginnings as an effective organization, were not necessarily synonymous. As everybody knows, it is no coincidence that the FBI became a real factor in the enforcement of federal law in 1924 when J. Edgar Hoover became its head. One augury of a successful future for the enterprise came when Mr. Hoover, as one of his first acts, established a centralized fingerprint collection to be maintained by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

bureau and the other a voluntary association of police officials--
enormous progress was made in the direction of bringing crime prevention into line with the realities of our times. Yet testimony to the fact that there is still progress to be made was given you in this same assembly last year when Police Chief George A. Olleinder (?) remarked that: "...on every hand, we have division of authority, division of thinking, and finally division of operation."

In other words, the time arrived long ago when national and international police cooperation became a condition to the successful control of crime, even within a particular locality. And although that cooperation has not yet become complete, all of us can be thankful for the progress that has been made.

The Central Intelligence Agency also represents great but incomplete progress in a problem of achieving cooperation. The origins of this Agency date from the time when the United States not only could not afford a local view of internal affairs but could no longer afford a national outlook in international affairs.

Leacock, a compatriot of you Canadian representatives, twenty five years ago:

"The Americans are a queer people; they don't give a damn. All the world criticizes them, and they don't give a damn....The Europeans threaten to unite against them; they don't mind. Equatorial Africa is dead sour on them; they don't even know it. The Chinese look on them as full of Oriental cunning; the English accuse them of British stupidity; the Scotch call them close-fisted; the Italians say they are liars; the French think their morals loose, and the Bolsheviks accuse them of Communism!

"But that's all right", Leacock concluded, "The Americans don't give a damn; don't need to; never did need to. That is their salvation."

I should say, in general, that the American attitude of not giving a damn what foreigners think of them is still with us; but I am afraid the day is long past when we, as a nation, "don't need to" care who unites against us, or how much anti-American sentiment there is in Africa; or in fact when we can afford to ignore any of the foreign attitudes listed by Leacock except, possibly whether or not the Bolsheviks

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Nowadays, the United States must care about world alliances and world opinion, primarily because the world is smaller--just as the local police authority in America must interest himself in affairs beyond his own community because the United States is smaller.

It has been said that not just the garrison at Pearl Harbor, but all of us, were sound asleep on the morning of December 7, 1941. We were awakened, then and there, to the sort of world we were going to have to live in thereafter. We might have gone back to sleep again after the war, as had been our custom after previous wars, but the events of 1946 alone were enough to show us that there could be no sleep for the kind of world power that we had become. Aside from the fact of world leadership, and the more obvious elements in the world balance of power, there were two main reasons for this: the existence of explosive situations in many parts of the world, and the existence of an international conspiracy that was bent, among other things, upon making them more explosive.

we were, in fact, confronted as a reality, with a vast political organization determined regardless of any laws either civil or moral to interfere with the rights of people in any non-Communist country to organize their political life as they saw fit. I refer, of course, to the International Communist movement with its headquarters in Moscow, with an affiliated organization in Peiping, and with branch offices in Warsaw, in Prague, and in many other parts of the world.

As Chiefs of Police from all over the United States and from foreign countries, you must know this international conspiracy well and at first hand, for it operates wherever it chooses, with disregard for local law except where it hopes to pervert the safeguards of the free world to its purposes. I am sure, the FBI could not discharge its responsibilities to protect the United States against such internal subversion, except through the invaluable cooperation of state and local police authorities any more than you could do your job as well as you do now without the cooperation of the FBI. We too, by the way, work in cooperation with the Bureau on many matters of common interest and know how valuable that cooperation can be.

Largely because of what your organization represents, I feel certain that the international communists are going to find it harder and harder to make any progress

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wish to destroy.

The Central Intelligence Agency was of course not expressly formed to combat international communism outside the area where national police forces deal with it, but this naturally became one of its tasks. Congress in 1947 was aware of this Soviet-led conspiracy that increased the danger of war, however by forceful annexation of new territory, and by attempts to weaken and divide the free countries. In a perilous world, grown so small that disaster could happen far more suddenly and unexpectedly than at Pearl Harbor, there was little alternative to the establishment of a central intelligence in some form. Without a sound intelligence system, there could be no real protection against the dangers that beset us.

But just as the beginnings of national and international police cooperation in 1893 or 1908 did not coincide with the establishment of police forces themselves, so the creation of Central Intelligence in 1947 did not coincide with the beginnings of intelligence activities on the part of the United States. Intelligence--which, simply defined, is knowing what is happening in other parts of the world--has always been a function of our government, even though on a smaller scale than was customary in

The Central Intelligence Agency was not devised by Congress as a means of setting intelligence activities in motion; but rather as a way of bringing together all the activities of the government related to intelligence and making them function harmoniously toward the single end of national security. If you read the National Security Act of 1947, you will find that the main duty of Central Intelligence is to "coordinate"; that is to say, its job is to supply the means through which divers activities may be unified for recognized purposes.

In these complicated times this is no mean job. You can imagine for example that the United States government, nowadays, receives a good deal of information from abroad. Some of it comes as a by-product of our normal transactions in foreign countries; some comes by way of the information that foreign countries normally publish for the rest of the world to see; some is deliberately sought for intelligence purposes. All of this information has to be studied, sorted, analyzed, and filed away for reference. What can be gleaned from it of importance has to be assembled and sent, in the form of various reports, to those in authority who need

There is nothing very glamorous about the process. In essence, it more resembles the work of a scholar, piecing together information stored in libraries than it does the romantic intrigues of the beautiful international spy so dear to the hearts of those who purvey fiction to an eager public. I suspect that you follow me more exactly in this matter than most people could, since you must see the parallel between our work and the painstaking research that you do in preparation for an apparently sudden and dramatic arrest and conviction.

Painstaking research has largely taken the place of dramatic adventure in intelligence. Once upon a time, when a small group of men controlled foreign policy in the name of the king, possession of their immediate plans meant knowledge of their country's intentions and purposes. In those days, the shifty agent who could penetrate the confidence of this group was an indispensable, if not wholly desirable, element in intelligence work. But in modern times, although a small group of men (as in the USSR) may control a nation's foreign policy in theory, it cannot do so in fact.

For that reason, it is necessary, in order to understand a country's

You must find out what those rulers can and will do in terms of their own internal strengths and weaknesses and their relations with the rest of the world. Particularly with respect to a major foreign power, this requires a great deal more than any one agent, no matter how astute or resourceful, can possibly find out.

In fact, espionage, either exciting or humdrum, is not the primary answer to the problem. The answer is partly to be found in manifold kinds of information gathered from numerous sources (mostly quite public) about conditions all over the world; and partly in what a great many people of many backgrounds and specializations can make of this information after they have put it all together. No single intelligence agency of any government could provide the answer. The coordinated efforts of many parts of the government and of the nation generally must be combined if even a partial answer is to be found.

The job of Central Intelligence is to provide this service of coordination to the government and particularly for the benefit of the National Security Council, to which I directly report. As you know, the National

Defense is the President's special advisory body on questions of foreign policy. Although I sit with the Council as Director of Central Intelligence, I neither vote with it nor do I give it advice regarding foreign policy. The reason is that neither the formation of foreign policy, nor advice on what policies to follow, is the business of intelligence. My function--aside from advising the Council on matters of intelligence organization--is to provide foreign information pertinent to the policy deliberations of the National Security Council and for the benefit of those who give the Council advice.

This foreign information has been gathered and compiled by the Agency of which I am Director, in cooperation with other agencies of the government, particularly those concerned with intelligence in the Departments of State and of Defense. Before it is considered ready for the Council, however, it is fully discussed with the heads of military and civilian intelligence (including of course Mr. Hoover or his representative) to make sure that all of us are in agreement on the accuracy of our facts and the authenticity of the interpretation placed upon them.

One of the ultimate aims of police work, I take it, is to make all

the facts available to a court, in order that it may render a sound verdict. Our aim is similar, except that our "court" is the National Security Council. I suspect that in the long run, both of us proceed in much the same way in assembling and presenting these facts.

Upon your success depends the protection of society against the criminal element in it. Upon ours depends, in part, the protection of our national security against the lawless element in international affairs. Apart from the physical protection represented in the military establishment, a sound and working intelligence system is the best protection that any government may have against that element.

In the eight years since Congress brought the Central Intelligence Agency into being, we believe that we have made considerable progress toward carrying out its mandate. We have not, of course, solved all the problems. Although intelligence was already old in the government in 1947, the idea of Central Intelligence was new. Old habits had to be changed; new methods of procedure had to be devised and made to work. I am aware that the problem of coordination within a single government faced by

your organization in relating the work of many governments; but it was complicated enough and did not yield to immediate solution.

At the present time, however, I am convinced that intelligence is so organized in the United States that we can confidently face the terrifying complications of the twentieth century in the knowledge that our policies are guided by sound information, and that our defenses are well prepared against any attempt at a surprise attack. Our aim is to continue to improve our services toward these goals.